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[367] 
Inconsistency and Angst  
in District Court Resolution  
of Social Security Disability Appeals 
Harold J. Krent and Scott Morris 
This study of federal court decisionmaking asks whether characteristics of a jurist 
including age, race, gender, and work experience, can affect results in the context of the 
nation’s most frequently litigated administrative law dispute—social security disability 
claims. SSDI cases by and large are similar, turning most frequently on claims of mental 
illness and muscular skeletal pain. Thus, there is ample room for discretion among ALJs 
and federal judges in determining whether an applicant is entitled to benefits.  
 
The results are remarkable both in what they showed and did not show. First, 
decisionmaking patterns among district court judges and magistrates both reveal the same 
kind of inconsistencies that plague ALJ adjudication more generally. The results of an 
SSDI appeal might turn more on the hap of which judge or magistrate is slated to review 
the appeal than on the merits of the case. 
 
Second, if the cases are similar, the question arises as to what explains the difference in 
outcomes. Again, the results are striking in that no correlation can be drawn between 
results and the race, gender, seniority, and job experience of the jurist. Nor can they be 
explained by geography or the percentage of disabled within the region. 
 
Third, although sociological attributes did not explain much of the variation in resolution 
of the cases, we noted a substantial correlation between remand rates and the circuit in 
which the judges and magistrates sat. Remand rates from both judges and magistrates in 
the Tenth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, for instance, were almost double those from 
judges and magistrates in the First and Fourth Circuits. The statistics strongly suggest that 
the “culture’ within a particular judicial circuit makes a substantial difference in such 
decisionmaking. 
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stewardship of the coding project. 
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Introduction 
This empirical study examines appeals in the federal district court 
from the Social Security Agency’s denial of benefits. The results reveal 
striking inconsistency across the country, a finding seemingly at odds 
with the goal of judicial impartiality enshrined in our very social fabric. 
To the extent we believe in a rule of law and not a rule of man, judicial 
decisions should be resolved the same no matter the experience or 
political leanings of the jurist.1 Our legal system furnishes the tools and 
precedents to generate “right” answers. Supreme Court appointees 
themselves have used the metaphor of the baseball umpire to describe 
judging: just calling strikes or balls in an objective fashion.2 From time to 
time, we second-guess umpires’ calls, but rarely question whether they 
favor one side over the other. 
 
 1. As Judge Harry Edwards stated, “members of the federal judiciary strive, most often 
successfully, to decide cases in accord with the law rather than with their own ideological or partisan 
preferences.” Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled 
Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 838; Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of 
the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 621, 645 (1994). 
 2. For one of many assessments of Chief Justice John Roberts’ famous analogy, see Bruce 
Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2009, at WK4. 
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The public, however, has never believed fully in the judicial 
impartiality rubric, and political charges have been leveled against judges 
even before Marbury v. Madison.3 The realists a few generations ago 
famously wrote that jurists must be understood within the economic and 
social milieu of their upbringing and times. 
Political scientists and, more recently, law professors have begun to 
code judicial opinions on an ideological scale to determine if judges 
appointed by conservative presidents tend to decide cases conservatively, 
and if judges appointed by more liberal presidents tend to decide cases 
more liberally. Not surprisingly, studies of politically charged cases have 
demonstrated such an intuitive link;4 jurists cannot escape their ideology. 
Such empirical evidence does not shatter any goal of judicial impartiality, 
but does suggest that the political ideology of the jurist, at least as 
measured by the politics of the appointing entity,5 can make a difference 
in judging.6 There is so much room for discretion in interpreting 
constitutional or statutory language, as well as in assessing the importance of 
precedents, that many outcomes in high salience cases likely turn on the 
ideology of the judge.7 Indeed, courts limit judge shopping to preserve an 
external appearance of fairness.8 
Other scholars have bemoaned the “thinness” of the ideological 
coding, which typically focuses on the ideology of the President as the 
appointing entity.9 It seems that jurists’ views cannot always be captured 
by reference to such clunky measures, and those views might evolve over 
time. 
Moreover, some academics suggest that culture as opposed to ideology 
wields a larger role in predicting judicial behavior.10 If we understand the 
familial, religious, and educational background of a jurist, we may gain a 
 
 3. 4 U.S. 137 (1803). See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 1095, 1096 (2004) (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s conflicts of interest in Marbury). 
 4. See, e.g., C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District 
Courts 24–57 (1996); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1445–52 (2001); Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law 
Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. Legal Stud. 333 (2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. 
L. Rev. 1717 (1997). 
 6. Ideology can also be measured in part by deviation from expected results as generated by 
surveys. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 349–50.  
 7. Id. at 350–51. 
 8. Federal courts, for instance, rarely inform litigants at the time of filing which judges are 
assigned to the case. 
 9. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 
1462−68 (2013). 
 10. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 149, 150 (2006); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107, 
117 (2010). 
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better understanding of her judging.11 Culture might not be as easily 
verified as the litmus test of the politics of the appointing entity, but a 
richer view might emerge through such efforts. 
Indeed, political scientists,12 and to a lesser extent legal academics,13 
have attempted to correlate attributes of judges with judicial decisions. 
For instance, academics have mapped votes on the constitutionality of 
the Sentencing Guidelines14 and on Free Exercise Clause claims15 against 
the race and religion of particular jurists. Some correlations were found, 
furthering the observation that the assignment of particular judges to 
hear particular claims can and has altered the outcome of cases. 
This study sheds new insight on the link between judicial outcomes, 
judicial ideology, and demographic factors. We ask whether 
characteristics of a jurist other than ideology, including age, race, gender, 
and work experience, can affect results in the context of the nation’s 
most frequently litigated administrative law dispute—Social Security 
disability claims. 
Over 10,000 Social Security disability cases are resolved each year in 
the federal court system.16 As a consequence, almost every district court 
judge and magistrate decides a significant number of such appeals from 
claimants each year. Social Security disability disputes, therefore, 
generate enough cases to permit meaningful comparisons among jurists. 
What is remarkable about Social Security cases is that, by and large, 
they are similar.17 All appeals arise in cases where the state Disability 
Determination Service (“DDS”) has denied an initial claim for disability 
and a Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”), after a de novo hearing, has upheld the denial.18 (The SSA 
 
 11. Judges’ religion has been found highly correlated with views of the First Amendment’s 
religious clauses. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic 
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743, 764–65 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case Characteristics: An 
Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 Judicature 277 (1988); Frank 
B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing 
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998). 
 13. See, e.g., Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making: 
An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 185 (2012). 
 14. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377 (1998). 
 15. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 11. 
 16. Federal Court Review Process, Soc. Sec., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/appeals/court_process. 
html#&a0=1 (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). From October 2013 to September 2014, the SSA received over 
18,000 new court cases. Id. 
 17. Hal Daub et al., Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Improving the Social Security Administration’s 
Hearing Process 6 (2006). 
 18. Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Achieving Greater 
Consistency in Social Security Disability Adjudication: An Empirical Study and Suggested 
Reforms 5–6 (2013). 
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cannot directly appeal an ALJ’s grant of benefits.19) Although the 
disabilities vary with geography and demographics,20 twenty percent of all 
beneficiaries suffer from some type of mental disorder.21 There are few 
clear markers whether someone with a mood disorder is capable of 
gainful employment.22 Also, an even greater percentage of cases turn on 
muscular skeletal pain,23 which also is notoriously difficult to ascertain on 
any objective basis.24 Lab results are rarely dispositive—rather, most of 
the cases turn on the claimant’s testimony and letters from physicians.25 
Additionally, the percentage of recipients falling into those two 
categories has been growing.26 In other words, there is ample room for 
discretion among ALJs and federal judges in determining whether an 
applicant is entitled to benefits when the claim turns on the presence of 
debilitating mental illness or on the amount of pain experienced. Pain 
cannot be assessed on an objective scale, and tolerance for pain differs 
markedly.27 Although the cases assigned to a particular jurist vary in 
terms of subject matter, over time the pool of cases that each jurist sees 
reflects the same type of claims.28 Thus, this Article constitutes the first 
study to assess and compare the decisionmaking of virtually all district 
court judges resolving nearly identical challenges.29 
 
 19. SSA, however, has the authority to review an ALJ’s decision before it becomes finalized 
through a mechanism termed “own motion review.” See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 82–84. 
 21. Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program 105–10 tbl.40 (2012). That percentage evidently has risen recently. Javier Meseguer, 
Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: The Role of Primary 
Diagnosis, 73 Soc. Sec. Bull. 39, 51 (2013) (reporting a historical figure of seventeen percent).  
 22. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?, Reg., 
Fall 2011, at 35. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Meseguer, supra note 21, at 41; see also Pierce, supra note 22, at 35 (“[T]here are no objective 
diagnostic criteria that can be used to measure the degree of an applicant’s anxiety, depression, or 
pain.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, Poverty, Pain, and Precedent: The Fifth Circuit’s Social Security 
Jurisprudence, 25 St. Mary’s L.J. 81, 123 (1993). 
 26. Mark Duggan & Scott A. Imberman, Why Are the Disability Rolls Skyrocketing?: The 
Contribution of Population Characteristics, Economic Conditions, and Program Generosity, in Health 
at Older Ages: The Causes and Consequences of Declining Disability Among the Elderly 337, 
363–67 (David M. Cutler & David A. Wise eds., 2009). 
 27. Pierce, supra note 22, at 35. 
 28. Appeals from district court judges in particular are few and far between, so judges rarely have 
to be concerned with the views of superintending appellate judges. Others have charted the impact of 
potential appellate review. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 5, at 1729. Moreover, no “panel” effect is 
presented in our study because we focused only on trial judges. In any event, due to the low salience of 
SSDI cases, we doubt that there would be much of a panel effect. Id. at 1732. 
 29. For an empirical study of asylum decisions by administrative judges and appellate courts, see 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 
(2007). 
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Moreover, to our knowledge, no prior study has assessed the 
decisional pattern among the approximately 500 magistrate judges who 
assist district court judges. Magistrate judges are appointed by the 
federal courts they serve, so no ideology assessment is feasible given that 
one cannot capture ideology through the political leanings of the 
appointing authority, which in this case is a group of district court judges. 
Nonetheless, we were able to code other characteristics of most 
magistrates, including prior experience, age, and seniority in an effort to 
gauge the correlations between those factors and decisions on the 
appeals from denials of the Social Security disability claims. In turn, the 
results for the magistrates serve as a check on the results reached for the 
district court judges themselves. 
The results are remarkable both in what they did and did not show. 
We reach three principal conclusions. First, decisionmaking patterns 
among district court judges and magistrate judges reveal the same kind 
of inconsistencies that plague ALJ adjudication more generally. 
Inspector General reports and testimony before Congress have focused 
on the variance in ALJ grant rates as reasons to reform the SSA 
adjudication system. Professor Richard Pierce has stressed that “[s]tudies 
of ALJ disability decisionmaking have documented massive unexplained 
differences in the rate at which ALJs grant or deny benefits.”30 Indeed, 
he has seized on the unexplained difference in grant rates among ALJs as 
a reason to gut the entire ALJ corps.31 But, we determined that the 
differential in grant rates at the ALJ level also exists at the judicial 
level—some judges and magistrates affirm 100% of all SSDI and SSI 
appeals, while some affirm none.32 Thus, while ALJs have been attacked 
repeatedly for such inconsistencies, district court decisionmaking fares 
little better. The results of an SSDI appeal may turn more on the hap of 
which district judge or magistrate judge is slated to review the appeal 
than on the merits of the case. Of course, simply noting the disparity in 
judicial decisionmaking does not further our understanding of why such a 
disparity exists. 
Second, if the cases are by and large similar, the question arises as to 
what explains the difference in outcomes. Again, the results are striking 
in that the different outcomes cannot be explained by the sociological 
factors that others have investigated. No correlation can be drawn 
between results and the race, gender, seniority, and prior job experience 
of the jurist. Nor can the results be explained by geography or the 
percentage of disabled within the region of the appeal. And, there was 
only a modest correlation between judicial ideology as measured by the 
 
 30. Pierce, supra note 22, at 35. 
 31. Id. at 39; see also infra Figure 1. 
 32. See infra Figures 4 & 5 and text accompanying notes 82–84. 
G - Krent_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:39 PM 
February 2016]            SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY APPEALS 373 
politics of the appointing judge and the judicial decision—conservative 
judges tended to dismiss more appeals. In other words, sociological 
factors evidently played far less of a role in deciding SSDI and SSI cases 
than one would have expected. 
Third, although the sociological attributes did not explain much of 
the variation in resolution of the cases, we noted a substantial correlation 
between remand rates and the circuit in which the judges and magistrates 
sat. Remand rates from both judges and magistrates in the Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, for instance, were almost double those from 
judges and magistrates in the First and Fourth Circuits.33 To be sure, we 
cannot discount the possibility that personal beliefs—not captured in the 
attributes we tested for—play a significant role in district court and 
magistrate decisionmaking. Nonetheless, the statistics strongly suggest 
that the “culture” within a particular judicial circuit makes a substantial 
difference in such decisionmaking. 
I.  The Structure of SSI and SSDI Adjudication 
The Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Program prevents the 
aged, blind, and disabled from falling below the poverty line.34 To be 
eligible for SSI, applicants must be both indigent and disabled.35 Social 
Security Disability Insurance benefits (“SSDI”) in contrast are not based 
on the financial wherewithal of the claimant, but rather are predicated on 
a determination that claimants are both insured and disabled.36 The 
programs share the same definition of “disability”: the inability “to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than [twelve] months.”37 SSA must engage 
in the following five-step process to determine whether an individual is 
disabled38: 
 
 
 33. See infra Figures 6 & 7. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2015); 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2015). This background section is adapted from 
Krent & Morris, supra note 18. 
 35. Nobles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2002 WL 553735, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2002) 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-231 (1972)); see also 42 U.S.C §§1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)−(C) (2015). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2015). Social Security deducts an amount from a worker’s paycheck if the 
worker earns sufficient wages. Every quarter of the year in which the worker has Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes is considered a quarter of coverage. Most claimants must work 
forty quarters of coverage to be considered “insured.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.140 (2015). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2015). 
 38. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2015). 
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(1) If SSA finds the individual to be engaged in substantial gainful 
activity, the Commissioner will find the individual not disabled.39 
 (2) If the individual does not have a severe medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment or a combination of such impairments that 
is severe and meets the duration requirement, SSA will find the 
individual not disabled.40 
(3) If SSA determines that an impairment meets or equals one of 
the listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 of 20 C.F.R. 
section 416.920, SSA will find the individual disabled.41 
 (4) If SSA determines, based on the individual’s residual functional 
capacity and past relevant work, that the individual can do her past 
work, the individual will be found not disabled.42 
(5) SSA will find the individual disabled if the individual cannot 
make an adjustment to perform other work in the economy. If the 
individual can make such an adjustment, SSA will find the individual 
not disabled.43 
Social Security disability claimants must complete an application 
with the local Social Security office.44 The local office determines if the 
applicant is indigent when applying for SSI or insured when applying for 
SSDI.45 If the claimant does not qualify, a notice of denial is mailed to the 
claimant; if the claimant is qualified, the file is sent to a state government 
agency operating as a Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) under 
contract with SSA.46 DDS may then gather medical documents or order 
an examination by a contracting physician, termed a consultative exam, 
to make a decision regarding the claimant’s disability status.47 DDS 
approval rates in the states vary considerably.48 
 
 39. Id. § 416.920(b). 
 40. Id. § 416.920(c). 
 41. Id. § 416.920(d). The Appendix 1 “listings” include the following categories of impairments: 
growth, musculoskeletal system, special senses and speech, respiratory system, cardiovascular system, 
digestive system, genitourinary, hematological, skin, endocrine system, congenital disorders that affect 
multiple body systems, neurological, mental, malignant neoplastic diseases, and immune system. 
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (2015). 
 42. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e) (2015). 
 43. Id. § 416.920(f). 
 44. James A. Maccaro, The Treating Physician Rule and the Adjudication of Claims for Social 
Security Disability Benefits, 41 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 833, 833 (1993).  
 45. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the 
Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
199, 219 (1990). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Am. Const. Soc. Law & Policy, Scapegoating Social 
Security Disability Claimants (and the Judges Who Evaluate Them) 4 (2012); see also Soc. Sec. 
Advisory Bd., Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials 43–44 (2012). 
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In all but ten states, a dissatisfied claimant may ask for 
“reconsideration.”49 Reconsideration involves the same procedures as an 
initial determination, but a different team in the same office makes the 
decision.50 The ten states that have abandoned the reconsideration level 
of review are termed “prototype” states.51 As a whole, states approve 
about forty percent of disability claims.52 
A claimant may appeal a decision within sixty days,53 and about one-
third of those whose claims were denied do in fact appeal. An ALJ 
presides over the appeal, conducting an in-person hearing with the 
claimant for the first time in the process.54 No deference is afforded to the 
DDS determination, and the ALJ may consider additional medical 
examinations and vocational or medical expert testimony, as well as 
personally question the claimant or other witnesses.55 Although ALJs 
preside at the hearings, they do not typically write the opinions. Rather, 
they provide instructions to decision writers, who need not be attorneys, 
to write the opinions after they decide whether to grant or deny 
benefits.56 The decision writers do not attend the hearings. SSA 
management, as opposed to ALJs, supervises the decision writers and 
direct decision writers to rotate among the ALJs.57 Senior attorney 
advisors, drawn from the ranks of decision writers, can review claims and 
order payment of benefits on their own.58 If the senior attorney advisors 
conclude that the case for payment is not clear, they transmit the files to 
the ALJs to schedule hearings. 
In contrast to most administrative adjudications, the agency is not 
represented at the hearing, while attorneys represent almost eighty 
percent of claimants.59 The percentage of cases in which claimants are 
 
 49. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (2015). Ten states do not permit reconsideration. See Soc. Sec. Admin., 
DI 12015.100 Disability Redesign Prototype Model (2012). 
 50. 20 C.F.R. § 404.915 (2015). 
 51. See supra note 49. 
 52. For more specific figures and differences in allowance rates among the states, see Soc. Sec. 
Advisory Bd., supra note 48, at 44 tbl.39. 
 53. 20 C.F.R. § 404.909 (2015); id. § 416.1409.  
 54. 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (2015); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405, 1383 (2015).  
 55. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1465 (2015).  
 56. Clearing the Backlog: Hearing on Office Performance Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Hon. Ronald G. Bernoski, President, 
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges). 
 57. See Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 
379, 408–09 (2012). 
 58. Securing the Future of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Hon. Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.). 
 59. Among dispositions issued in Fiscal Years (“FY”) 2009 to 2011, we found a claimant 
representative to be present in seventy-seven percent of hearings. This percentage was the same in 
each of the three years examined. We determined a correlation between representation and successful 
appeals. For an average ALJ, the expected allowance rate was sixty-four percent when a 
G - Krent_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:39 PM 
376 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:367 
represented has soared in the past thirty years.60 The adjudication system 
has been beset with delays, with sizeable backlogs preventing needy 
individuals from receiving their due.61 Although substantial progress has 
been made to minimize delays in claim adjudication, the 350-day median 
wait for a hearing before an ALJ is still unconscionable from the 
perspective of claimants who frequently are in dire need.62 ALJs have the 
duty to develop the record where needed, irrespective of whether the 
claimant is represented by counsel.63 ALJs resolve roughly 800,000 cases 
a year.64 ALJs in the past several years have determined that disability is 
warranted in roughly sixty percent of the cases decided, although the 
percentage has declined more recently.65 The allowance rate was sixty-
one percent in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2009 and FY 2010, and then dropped 
to fifty-six percent in FY 2011.66 The sharply divergent allowance rates 
among ALJs67 strongly suggest that the claims are being resolved in an 
inconsistent manner. ALJs labor under an SSA target of adjudicating 500 
to 700 cases a year.68 
 
representative was present, but only forty-seven percent in hearings without a representative. 
However, it is unclear whether the positive correlation exists because of the effectiveness of the 
representatives or due to the fact that representatives agree to help claimants only in stronger cases. 
 60. The percentage of represented cases in 1971, for instance, was twenty. See Wolfe, supra note 
57, at 406; see also Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 48, at 60. 
 61. Reducing the backlog has been an SSA priority. See Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 48, at 
2–3; Hearing, supra note 58. 
 62. Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 47, at 66 fig.61. The delay in Veterans disability cases can 
be just as long. See, e.g., Michael Martinez, Obama Says Backlog Reduced in Veterans’ Disability 
Claims, CNN (Aug. 10, 2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/10/us/obama-veterans/index.html.  
 63. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Barnhart, 302 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 64. Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2013 13 (2012). 
 65. There is no objective way to measure whether ALJs or state DDS systems measure 
“disability” more accurately. The ALJ proceeding is more in line with due process given that 
testimony is allowed. For one intriguing study concluding that ALJs are more likely to get it “right,” 
see Hugo Benítez-Silva et al., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, How Large Are the 
Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process? (2004). 
 66. For decisions issued by ALJs, the allowance rates were fifty-nine percent in FY 2009, fifty-
eight percent in FY 2010, and fifty-three percent in FY 2011. However, these figures do include 
decisions by senior attorneys, which are always favorable. Including the senior attorney decisions, the 
allowance rate was sixty-one percent in FY 2009 and FY 2010, and dropped to fifty-six percent in FY 
2011. Krent & Morris, supra note 18, at 22, 22 n.127. 
 67. Using data provided by SSA on adjudication outcomes from FY 2009 to FY 2011, we earlier 
found an average allowance rate of fifty-six percent and a standard deviation of fifteen percent. The 
yearly allowance rates ranged from four percent to ninety-eight percent, with ninety-five percent of 
the rates falling between twenty-six percent and eighty-five percent. See ALJ Disposition Data, Soc. 
Sec. Admin., ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2016) 
(listing disposition rates for all SSA ALJs). 
 68. SSA’s Chief ALJ articulated the goal in a 2007 Memorandum. Office of the Inspector Gen., 
Soc. Sec. Admin., A-12-11-01138, Oversight of Administrative Law Judge Workload 
Trends 3 n.4 (2012); see also Darrell Issa, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Misplaced 
Priorities: How the Social Security Administration Sacrificed Quality for Quantity in the 
Disability Determination Process 34–35 (2014). 
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If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ’s decision, the claimant 
has sixty days to appeal the adverse decision to SSA’s Appeals Council,69 
although the Council is not required by law to review each appeal on the 
merits.70 The Appeals Council will review a case if: (1) the ALJ 
committed an abuse of discretion; (2) there is an error of law; (3) the 
ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or (4) there is 
a broad policy issue that might affect the public interest.71 The Appeals 
Council may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand the ALJ’s decision.72 The 
Appeals Council also may exercise the authority to review cases on its 
own motion prior to effectuation. An Appeals Council determination 
represents the SSA’s final decision. A claimant may then appeal the 
agency’s decision to a federal court within sixty days.73 When cases are 
appealed to federal court, the reviewing court must uphold the agency’s 
findings so long as the findings are supported by “substantial evidence.”74 
The court may affirm, modify, or remand the decision.75 Courts generally 
only see appeals from denials of claims, so in that sense they do not 
consider a representative sampling of ALJ decisions. They reverse 
outright in slightly more than five percent of the cases.76 They remand at 
a rate of close to fifty percent, and most of the remanded cases result in 
an eventual grant of benefits.77 In FY 2011, the percentage remanded 
dipped to forty-two percent.78 
II.  The Inconsistency Problem at the ALJ Level 
The problem of inconsistency plagues ALJ adjudication of Social 
Security disability claims. SSA publishes the claim allowance rate of each 
ALJ on its website,79 and the dramatic variance erodes faith in the 
integrity of the adjudication system. Indeed, the disparities are so great 
that claimant representatives in 2013 vigorously and successfully lobbied 
 
 69. 20 C.F.R. § 404.968 (2015). 
 70. Hearing, supra note 58. 
 71. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (2015). 
 72. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1479 (2015).  
 73. Id. § 404.981; id. § 416.1481. 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2010); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c) (2011) (providing for substantial evidence 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010). 
 76. In FY 2011, the reversal rate dipped to three percent. Hearing, supra note 58, at 12. 
 77. With respect to district court remands, roughly two-thirds of the remanded claims are paid. 
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-331, SSA Has Taken Steps to Address Conflicting 
Court Decisions, but Needs to Manage Data Better on the Increasing Numbers of Court 
Remands 16 (2007); see also Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2011) (summarizing 
available data); Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Review of Social 
Security Disability Cases, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 731 (2003).  
 78. Krent & Morris, supra note 18, at 9, 9 n.56 (referring to follow-up email from Rainbow 
Forbes, Appeals Officer in the Appeals Council of Sept. 28, 2012). 
 79. ALJ Disposition Data, supra note 67. 
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Congress and the Secretary of SSA to block modest reforms that would 
have minimized claimants’ ability to forum shop so as to select an ALJ 
with a favorable claim allowance percentage.80 In this Part, we describe 
the extent of the disparities in ALJ adjudication to set a baseline before 
turning our eye to adjudication among district court judges and 
magistrates.81 
Inconsistencies among ALJs are alarming. For instance, in FY 2011, 
ten percent of ALJs had favorable rates in excess of seventy-two percent, 
while ten percent had favorable rates less than thirty-four percent. 
Twenty-five ALJs found for claimants at least ninety percent of the time, 
and about the same number found against claimants eighty percent of 
the time. Given the similarity in the pools of claims nationwide, such 
disparities should not arise. 
Claims assigned to particular ALJs differ, even when assigned in a 
random manner, and some types of claims predominate more in 
particular geographical jurisdictions. For instance, there is a three times 
higher percentage of disability claims based on the nervous system in 
Colorado as in Vermont, and four times greater percentage based on 
injuries in West Virginia than in South Dakota.82 One study concluded 
that variation in disability across states can be explained by the education 
level of the population in the state, the prevalent types of industries, and 
the percentage of immigrants.83 Nonetheless, substantial and unexplained 
variation also exists within states.84 
Even within the same SSA office, grant rates vary wildly. Looking at 
dispositions from September 29, 2012 through December 28, 2012 only at 
SSA Regional Offices starting with the letter A is telling: In the Akron 
office, Judge Thomas Ciccolini awarded 203 of 239 dispositions for a 
grant rate of 85% while Judge Barbara Sheehe awarded 48 of 103 for a 
rate of 47%; in Albuquerque, Judge Susan A. Burke awarded 134 of 144 
for a rate of 93% while Judge Ben Willner awarded 56 of 112 for a rate 
of 50%; in Alexandria, Judge Michael Walder awarded 118 of 174 for 
68% and Judge Lawrence Ragona awarded 29 of 101 for 29%. The 
biggest differential in the “A” offices belonged to Atlanta, with Judge 
Leroy Bryant awarding 72 of 81 for 89% while Judge Dale Glendening 
had 7 of 37 for 19%. Given that cases are to be assigned randomly within 
each office,85 these differences are hard to fathom. It is no wonder the 
 
 80. Charles T. Hall, “Secret ALJ” Policy on Its Last Legs, Soc. Sec. News (Feb. 14, 2013, 10:23 
AM), http://socsecnews.blogspot.com/2013/02/secret-alj-policy-on-its-last-legs.html. 
 81. For the inconsistency of asylum determinations, see Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 29. 
 82. Meseguer, supra note 21, at 62. 
 83. Kathy A. Ruffing, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Geographical Pattern of 
Disability Receipt Largely Reflects Economic and Demographic Factors (2015). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 68, at 9. 
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claimant community cares so deeply about knowing which ALJ will hear 
the claim prior to the day of the hearing.86 
To get a better sense of the inconsistency, we compiled a data set of 
1509 ALJs. Data were available from 1129 ALJs in FY 2009, 1256 ALJs 
in FY 2010, and 1360 ALJs in FY 2011, comprising a total of 3745 yearly 
data points.87 Three separate data sets were created representing 
monthly, yearly, and overall average statistics for each ALJ. Outcome 
variables included the percentage of dispositions with favorable 
outcomes (either fully favorable or partially favorable)88 and the number 
of dispositions conducted in a time period. 
A. Statistical Analysis of ALJ Variances 
1. Distribution of Favorable Rates  
On average, the yearly favorable rate was 56%. The distribution 
covered a wide range of favorable rates (Standard Deviation 
(“SD”)=15%), with 95% of the rates falling between 26% and 85%.89 At 
the lower end of the distribution, the favorable rate was less than half of 
the average rate, while those at the top of the distribution had favorable 
rates over 50% higher than the average. The lowest and highest 
favorable rates (4% and 98%, respectively) very nearly spanned the full 
range of possible values. 
 
 86. See Hall, supra note 80. 
 87. Our initial work helped predicate a report by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, recommending a number of reforms in administration of the Social Security disability system. 
See Krent & Morris, supra note 18. 
 88. Outcomes were initially classified into four categories: (1) fully favorable; (2) partially 
favorable; (3) unfavorable; and (4) dismissed. Because the rate of partially favorable decisions was 
small and did not show trends that were distinct from those of fully favorable decisions, the two were 
combined for this analysis. 
 89. A similar range was found when considering only fully favorable dispositions, where 95% of 
the rates were between 20% and 82%. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Yearly Favorable Rate 
 (Fully or Partially Favorable) 
 
Favorable rates have been steadily declining over time. The mean 
favorable rate dropped from 59% in FY 2009 to 57% in FY 2010 and 
53% in FY 2011, while the variance in favorable rates has been relatively 
stable over time. This decline occurred across the entire distribution of 
favorable rates, although there tended to be less change at the lower end 
of the distribution. Table 1 demonstrates the change at three points of 
the distribution. Similar changes were observed at the midpoint of the 
distribution and the 90th percentile,90 while change was smaller at the 
10th percentile. 
Corresponding to the drop in the mean favorable rate, the number 
of ALJs with extremely high rates has been declining. As shown in 
Table 2, the percentage of ALJs with favorable rates over 80% has 
dropped by half, from 9% in 2009 to 4% in 2011. At the other end of the 
distribution, the percentage of ALJs with extremely low favorable rates 
has been relatively stable—in essence, 5% in FY 2009 and 6% in FY 
2011. 
 
 
 90. The 90th percentile is the favorable rate which separates the top 10% of scores from the 
bottom 90%. Thus, the 90th percentile represents scores at the top of the distribution, while the 10th 
percentile represents scores at the bottom of the distribution. 
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Figure 2: Average Favorable Rate over Time91 
 
Table 1: Change in Favorable Rates over Time 
Percentile 2009 2010 2011 
10th 38% 38% 34% 
Median 59% 57% 52% 
90th 79% 76% 72% 
 
Table 2: Percentage of ALJs with Extreme Favorable Rates  
(Fully Favorable plus Partially Favorable) 
 
 91. Error bars indicate one SD above and below the average. 
 
Percent of ALJs 
below 20% 
favorable 
Percent of ALJs 
below 30% 
favorable 
Percent of ALJs 
above 70% 
favorable 
Percent of ALJs 
above 80% 
favorable 
2009 1% 5% 25% 9% 
2010 1% 4% 21% 7% 
2011 2% 6% 13% 4% 
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B. Explanation of Variability in Allowance Rate 
In our study of ALJ determinations, we did not come to any 
conclusion as to why there was such a great variety in allowance rate among 
ALJs. Although ALJs themselves have different practice backgrounds and 
seniority, SSA has not released such information to the public, and we 
could not map the allowance rate against any such variables. 
We did, however, note one correlation that may be of concern to 
policymakers. There was a strong correlation between the percentage of 
claims allowed and the total number of claims decided. Anecdotally, 
ALJs routinely informed us that so-termed “outlier judges”—those who 
adjudicated the most cases—routinely granted claims against the 
government because written opinions supporting grants took so much 
less time than denials.92 Granted claims do not get appealed, and 
therefore ALJs could cut corners in all cases awarding benefits.93 
Although decision writers draft the opinions, ALJs must first specify the 
analysis for the decisions writers to follow and then edit the drafts to 
ensure conformity with their views. In other words, ALJs could help 
reduce the backlog of those awaiting hearings by granting a higher 
percentage of claims. Moreover, ALJs with greater number of 
dispositions were perceived to curry favor with management, whether 
resulting in praise or preferential transfer options.94 Of course, some 
ALJs might grant more claims than others due to sympathy for the 
claimants or because of the particular characteristics of claims assigned 
to them. The SSA Inspector General previously reported that ALJs with 
high disposition rates were more likely to decide cases in favor of 
claimants.95 
To test this hypothesis, we examined the correlation between the 
grant rate for each ALJ and the average number of dispositions per year. 
We found a small but statistically significant correlation, r=.15, p<.001. 
Although significant, this correlation is modest, implying that the 
number of dispositions can account for about 2% of the variance in 
favorable rates. Thus, when considering the entire distribution of ALJs, 
the data do not support a general trend where higher distribution rates 
correspond to substantially higher favorable rates. 
Rather than examine the entire distribution, we then focused on 
ALJs at the extremes of the distribution. If those ALJs with extremely 
high disposition rates also tend to have high favorable rates, this might 
 
 92. See also Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2015) (commenting 
on same assertion). 
 93. Interestingly, Judge Kozinski has noted that the increase in workload for federal court judges 
pressures them into giving short shrift to small cases. Kozinski, supra note 3, at 1097. 
 94. See also Issa, supra note 68, at 35–45. 
 95. Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 68, at 7. 
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support the idea that favorable decisions are being used to boost 
disposition frequencies.  
We defined the top 1% of yearly disposition frequencies as those 
with 1079 or more dispositions in a fiscal year. This consisted of twenty-
two ALJs, six of whom were outliers in all three years, four were outliers 
in two years, and twelve were outliers in a single year. Comparison of the 
top 1% to other ALJs indicates that outliers issued fewer partially 
favorable decisions (2% vs. 5%), fewer unfavorable decisions (16% vs. 
29%), and more dismissed dispositions (23% vs. 15%). The difference in 
fully favorable rates (58% vs. 50%) was not statistically significant. 
Further, there was a trend of higher fully favorable rates among those 
with two or three years in the top 1% (65% fully favorable) compared to 
those in the top 1% for no or one year (50% fully favorable). 
Outliers can also be identified in terms of the decision outcomes. 
For this analysis, we combined fully favorable and partially favorable 
decisions to identify those ALJs who tended to have atypically high or 
low grant rates. The top 1% of favorable rates (those issuing fully or 
partially favorable decisions in over 89% of cases) consisted of twenty-
five ALJs, fifteen with one year in the top 1%, seven with two years in 
the top 1%, and three with three years in the top 1%. Groups defined by 
number of years in the top 1% of favorable rates tended to differ in the 
number of dispositions issued, F(3741)=17.32, p<.01. ALJs with three 
years of high favorable rates tended to issue a high number of 
dispositions per year ((SD)=360, Mean (“M”)=866), as did ALJs with 
two years of high favorable rates (M=724, SD=338). Those with a single 
year in the top 1% issued a similar number of dispositions (M=557, 
SD=220) to those who were never in the top 1% (M=537, SD=177). 
The bottom 1% of favorable rates (those under 19%) consisted of 
twenty-four ALJs, fourteen with one year in the bottom 1%, five with 
two years in the bottom 1%, and five with three years in the bottom 1%. 
There was no consistent pattern in the number of dispositions issued. 
The number of dispositions tended to be below average for ALJs with 
one year in the bottom 1% (M=405, SD=158) and those with three years 
in the bottom 1% (M=417, SD=87). However, those with two years in the 
bottom 1% (M=530, SD=81) were similar to those who were never in the 
bottom 1% (M=541, SD=181). 
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Figure 3: Disposition Outcome Rates for ALJs Close to  
Yearly Disposition Goal 
 
The correlation between number of cases decided and allowance 
percentage led the House of Representatives recently to invite ALJs with 
high allowance rates to a committee hearing. The House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee issued a report in early 2014 summarizing 
that ALJs with large numbers of dispositions had summarily granted 
benefits at clips above eighty-five percent, potentially costing the 
taxpayers billions in lifetime benefits.96 One of the judges testified that he 
had received a letter from superiors at SSA appreciative of his speedy 
turnover of cases.97 
In short, the percentage of disability claims awarded by ALJs differs 
markedly from region to region and from ALJ to ALJ. No immediate 
explanations arise other than the predisposition of the ALJ, although we 
determinedas have others98that there was a correlation between the 
number of dispositions and claims granted, at least for so-termed outlier 
judges. 
III.  Dispositions at the Federal Court Level 
Unlike with ALJs, no record of adjudications is available for district 
court judges or magistrates on the SSA website. We therefore sought to 
 
 96. Press Release, House Oversight & Gov’t Reform Comm., Oversight Report Finds Disability 
Programs’ Rubber-Stamping Judges Waste Billions (June 10, 2014) (on file with author). 
 97. Dave Boucher, Report: Charleston Judge “Rubber Stamped” Disability Claims, Charleston 
Gazette-Mail (June 10, 2014), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20140610/DM01/140619970. 
 98. See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Office 
of the Inspector Gen., supra note 68. 
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build a database of district court judge and magistrate decisions in 
disability cases to determine, first, if a similar variation in disposition 
rates exists and, second, whether we could then attempt to correlate any 
variation in rate with particular attributes of the judges and magistrates, 
whether seniority or political leaning. 
A. The Data 
To generate a database, we analyzed approximately 10,750 cases in 
the federal courts between 2010 and 2012 seeking review of SSA’s 
administrative decisions denying benefits. Although the evidentiary basis 
in SSDI and SSI decisions differ, we decided that combining the categories 
for coding purposes was appropriate because the provisions’ definitions of 
disability are the same and many cases cited to both provisions. 
1. District Court Judges 
The Federal Judicial Center, the “research and education agency” 
of the federal judiciary, maintains a publicly accessible database on all 
current and former Article III judges. This database contains extensive 
biographical, demographic, educational, and professional information on 
each judge and is available for download through the Federal Judicial 
Center’s Database Export tool.99 We narrowed this set to the following 
variables for each judge: circuit, district, state, appointment year (to 
calculate years on the bench100), gender, race, birth year, and political 
party affiliation of the appointing president. 
We then added eight categories of relevant prior work experience: 
private practice, three concerning government work (prosecution, 
criminal defense, and civil), military, academia, public interest, and 
judicial (whether at the state or administrative level). Reasoning that a 
minimum of two years’ experience in a field is needed to influence an 
individual’s worldview significantly, we indicated such information for 
each judge. 
The data used for our analysis consisted of 5581 decisions by 342 
judges,101 with each judge providing between 5 and 144 decisions 
(M=16.3, Median=11, SD=16.1). The sample of judges consisted of 261 
men and 81 women. The ethnic composition of judges was 87% Caucasian, 
10% African American, and 3% Latino. Age in 2010 ranged from forty-
one to ninety-eight, with a median age of sixty-two (M=63, SD=9.9). 
 
 99. History of the Federal Judiciary, Fed. Judiciary Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/ 
export.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 100. Years on the bench was defined as of 2010, regardless of the year in which a decision was reached. 
 101. We were able to match 668 judges to outcomes from 6281 cases (M=9.3 cases per judge, 
Median=5). A large number of judges had only one or two decisions, which provided too little 
information to compute a remand rate. Therefore, only judges with at least five decisions were 
retained for further analysis. 
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Judges had from zero to forty-seven years of experience, with a median 
of twelve years (M=13.3, SD=9.1). 
2. Magistrate Judges 
In contrast to information on the district judges, no comprehensive 
public database exists for federal magistrate judges. In part, the 
comparably higher rate of turnover for federal magistrates makes such a 
task more difficult, but even a thorough search of academic, subscription-
based services yields little to no information for many magistrates 
currently on the bench. Our search started with compiling a list of all 
magistrates serving for any period of time between 2010 and 2012. 
Through web research using search engines likes Google News and 
Google Scholar, open source wiki sites like Judgepedia,102 law schools’ 
career services materials, and biographical pages from federal district 
court websites, we identified 639 magistrate judges fitting our criteria. 
The vast majority of these were full-time magistrates (eight-year 
appointments), although many were part-time magistrates (four-year 
appointments) or recalled magistrates (appointments of retired 
magistrates for up to five years, based on the district’s needs). 
Next, we created a database for the magistrates using the same 
variables as the district court judge set, except for the political party 
affiliation field (as magistrates are appointed by federal district court 
judges rather than the President). To gather these variables, we utilized 
media sources gleaned through web searches (outlined above), as well as 
subscription services like the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary and the 
West Legal Directory. To a much lesser extent, we used the Judicial 
Yellow Book and the American Bench. Additionally, we relied on data 
from the Just the Beginning Foundation, a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to diversity in the federal judiciary, which maintains statistics 
on African American, Asian American, Latino American, Native 
American, and female federal judicial officials.103 For judges whose birth 
years were not ascertainable, we used years since their undergraduate 
graduation, where available, plus twenty-three years as a proxy for age. 
This analysis of magistrate decisionmaking was based on 7632 
rulings from 280 magistrates,104 with between 5 and 259 cases per 
magistrate (M=27.3, Median=18, SD=40.0). The sample consisted of 195 
 
 102. Judgepedia, Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Judgepedia (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 103. Statistics on the Integration of the Federal Judiciary, Just Beginning Found., 
http://www.jtb.org/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=StatisticsontheIntegrationoftheFederalJudiciary (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016). The Foundation’s lists are current through October 2012. 
 104. We were able to match 393 magistrates to outcomes from 7885 cases; however, a large 
number of magistrates had only one or two decisions, which provided too little information to 
compute remand rates. Therefore, only magistrates with at least five decisions were retained for 
further analysis. 
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men and 85 women. Ethnic composition of the magistrates was 62% 
Caucasian, 5% African American, 2% Latino, 1% Asian American, and 
29% unknown. The average age was 55.9 years (Median=58, SD=9.3). 
3. District Court Characteristics 
Several features of the district in which the magistrates sat were 
coded in our analysis. The population of each district was obtained from 
the 2011 U.S. Census population estimates. Because the distribution of 
population across districts was positively skewed, we used the natural log 
of the population as the index of district size. The proportion of the 
population receiving disability benefits was obtained from Social Security 
Administration 2011 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program.105 Each state was coded as Democrat-
leaning, Republican-leaning, or neutral, using data compiled from Gallup 
polls in 2012.106 A state was coded as identifying with a party if the 
percent of the population supporting that party was at least five percent 
greater than the percent supporting the opposing party. 
4. Cases 
We experimented with a variety of searches in WestlawNext and 
Lexis Advance to determine which terms and database would yield the 
most relevant results. Lexis Advance contained many times more 
(unpublished) SSDI and SSI opinions than WestlawNext, so we further 
refined our search terms on that database. A search using the words 
“SSI” or “SSDI” and “ALJ” and “Astrue” in federal jurisdictions from 
2010 through 2012 yielded 11,264 hits.107 As we progressed through the 
compilation process (described below), we recorded only cases that 
received a ruling on the merits for the first time between 2010 and 2012.108 
Thus, we eliminated costs and fees proceedings, rulings on motions for 
reconsideration, and cases with history predating 2010. Additionally, we 
did not track appeals to the circuit courts.109 This process resulted in a 
 
 105. Office of Ret. & Disability Policy, Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Statistical Report on the 
Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2011 (2012), https://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/stat
comps/di_asr/2011/index.html. 
 106. Lydia Saad, In the U.S., Blue States Outnumber Red States, 20 to 12, Gallup (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160175/blue-states-outnumber-red-states.aspx#2. 
 107. Michael J. Astrue served as the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration from 2007 
to 2013, covering the whole period of this study. Press Office, Soc. Sec. Admin., https://www.ssa.gov/ 
news/press/factsheets/astrue.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 108. Occasionally, magistrates’ opinions take the form of letters addressed to counsel. These 
letters are generally structured like opinions and contain a closing line stating that, despite their 
informal nature, they should be filed as opinions. We treated these as opinions and included them in 
the database. 
 109. We chose not to track appellate decisions because there were an insufficient number to obtain 
a representative sampling from each appellate judge. 
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final set of 10,743 cases.110 The Federal Judicial Center has reported that 
almost four times as many SSDI and SSI cases were resolved during that 
period.111 Many likely were settled or voluntarily dismissed, and others 
likely were not reported in the Lexis Advance database. We have no 
reason to doubt that the 10,743 cases analyzed are representative of all 
denials appealed to the courts. 
5. Database Structure 
To index the cases, we built a database with the following fields: 
circuit, district, case name and citation, case year, magistrate judge name, 
report and recommendation (“R&R”), magistrate judge’s ruling, name 
and citation for the case’s subsequent history, subsequent history year, 
district court judge name, R&R adoption, and the district court judge’s 
ultimate ruling. The ultimate concern of the studydetermining what 
factors, if any, contribute to a plaintiff’s success in convincing a federal 
court to rethink the denial of benefits by an administrative agencyled 
to two decisions about coding the adjudication data. First, we 
disregarded the distinction between sentence four and sentence six of 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g), as the details of the case outcome were not as important 
as whether the appeal was affirmed or not. 
Second, again to reflect the up or down outcome for the plaintiff, we 
combined reversals and remands. In cases where the magistrate or 
district court judge reversed or remanded the ALJ’s ruling, we coded this 
as “Rev/Rem,” reflecting a victory for the plaintiff.112 “Affirm” is used for 
complete affirmations, while “Rev/Rem in Part” is used for all partial 
rulings. Because the number of decisions involving Rev/Rem in Part was 
quite small (less than two percent of rulings), these outcomes were 
combined with Rev/Rem rulings for the purpose of the analyses 
described below. For magistrate opinions, the database indicates whether 
the ruling is a final adjudication (under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)) or an R&R 
requiring approval by a district judge. In cases where a district judge 
reviewed a magistrate’s R&R, the database indicates whether the district 
judge adopted, adopted in part, or completely rejected the R&R. 
6. Database Compilation 
To ensure accuracy, a research team of assistants coded several 
matched sample sets and compared discrepancies. Once all of the team 
members were coding the cases similarly, we narrowed the search results 
 
 110. The subsequent history of the cases in the database is current through November 2013. 
 111. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/archive.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
 112. Of course, such plaintiffs might not have received benefits upon remand, but they nonetheless 
succeeded in forcing another look at their cases. As mentioned previously, most remands result in an 
award of benefits. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 77. 
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by circuit, sorted them chronologically, and proceeded to record the data 
for each case. Cases appearing in the initial search hits often contained 
links to prior or subsequent case history that met our study’s criteria; we 
included these in the database as well. 
For cases that went first to a district court judge, we recorded the 
judge’s final ruling. For cases that went first to a magistrate judge, the 
process was bifurcated. If the magistrate, upon consent of the parties, 
issued an adjudication under 28 U.S.C. § 636, we recorded the 
magistrate’s final ruling. If the magistrate issued an R&R (the most 
common of the three possibilities), we coded the R&R ruling, tracked 
that R&R to the district judge, and coded both the final ruling and the 
R&R adoption or rejection by the district court judge. Occasionally, the 
research team encountered an R&R with no locatable district court 
judge adopting opinion, or a district court judge adopting opinion with 
no locatable R&R; for the sake of completeness, the database contains 
these rare cases. 
B. Variability in Remand Rates 
On average, district court judges issued partial or full remands or 
reversals in 40% of cases (Median=38%). The remand rate varied 
considerably across judges, ranging from 0% to 100%, with a standard 
deviation of 23%. Seventeen of the judges (5%) issued no remands, and 
three judges (1%) remanded all of their cases. The number of cases 
reviewed by these judges tended to be slightly lower than in the full 
dataset (five to twenty-one cases, with about nine cases per judge on 
average); nevertheless, the probability of these results occurring due to 
chance, if the remand rate were the same for all judges, was extremely 
small. 
The distribution of remand rates is shown in Figure 4. Even ignoring 
the extreme cases (the 5% in the extreme upper and lower tails of the 
distribution), remand rates ranged from 0% to 85%. The remand rate at 
the 75th percentile of the distribution (57% remanded) was almost three 
times the remand rate at the 25th percentile (20% remanded). 
The results for magistrate decisions by magistrates were similar. On 
average, magistrates issued full or partial remands or reversals in 40% of 
cases The median was 50%. The remand rate for magistrates ranged 
from 0% to 100%, with a standard deviation of 21.4%. Ignoring the most 
extreme 5% of the distribution, remand rates ranged from 8% to 86%. 
Twenty-five percent of magistrates had remand rates below 22%, while 
the top 25% remanded over 56% of cases. In other words, the remand 
rate at the 75th percentile (56% remanded) was 2.5 times higher than the 
25th percentile (22% remanded). The distribution of magistrate remand 
rates is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of District Court Judge Remand Rates 
Figure 5: Distribution of Magistrate Judge Remand Rates 
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Given the concerns expressed regarding inconsistencies in ALJ 
adjudication outcomes, we compared the variability of outcomes in the 
current study to the variability of ALJ decisions previously noted. We 
recognize that ALJs see more cases and act as initial decisionmakers, as 
opposed to magistrates and district court judges who serve in an appellate 
capacity. Nevertheless, the comparison, however inexact, serves as a rough 
indication of the magnitude of the inconsistency. 
Table 5 summarizes the distribution of judge and magistrate remand 
rates in relation to ALJ allowance rates.113 Comparison of the means 
reveals a substantial difference, with noticeably lower favorable decision 
rates for judges and magistrates than for ALJs. As noted above, this 
likely reflects differences in the nature of the two types of decisions and 
the degree of prior screening of cases reviewed. 
Of greater importance for the current study is the comparison of 
standard deviations, which show a substantially larger spread among 
judges and magistrates than among ALJs. The variability of judges’ 
remand rates (SD=.23) was about 50% higher than the variability of ALJ 
allowance rates (SD=.15). 
An examination of the distribution reveals that the greater 
variability among judges represents more density at the lower end of the 
distribution. If one ignores a few outliers at the upper and lower end of 
the distribution (excluding the top and bottom 2.5%), ALJ allowance 
rates ranged from 26% to 85%. For district court judges and magistrates, 
the upper end of the distribution was similar, with the highest affirmance 
rate around 85%. In contrast, the lower tail of the distribution for district 
court judges and magistrates reached down to 0%, substantially lower than 
the 26% lower bound for ALJs. 
A similar picture appears if one considers the percentage of 
decisionmakers with extreme decision rates. A sizable number of district 
court judges had high remand rates (12% of district court judges 
remanded over 70% of cases), and was similar to the rate of high 
allowance rates among ALJs (13% of ALJs had allowance rates over 
70%). A substantial number of district court judges also had very low 
remand rates. Over one-third of district court judges had remand rates 
below 30% and 21% had a rate below 20%. In contrast, only 6% of ALJ 
allowance rates were below 30% and only 2% were below 20%. 
In summary, both district court judges and magistrates demonstrated 
substantial variability in remand rates. Moreover, the inconsistencies 
observed in district court decisions were substantially greater than that 
observed in ALJ allowance rates. We were surprised by the degree of 
 
 113. ALJ statistics were taken from an analysis of ALJ dispositions from 2009 to 2011. Krent & 
Morris, supra note 18. 
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inconsistency reflected by the divergent remand rates in district court 
decisionmaking. 
Table 3: Distribution of Favorable Decision Rates 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
ALJ Allowance 
Rate 
District Judges 
Reversal/Remand 
Rate 
Magistrates 
Reversal/Remand 
Rate 
Mean  56%  40%  40% 
SD  15%  23%  21% 
Range  4%–98%  0%–100%  0%–100% 
Range Excluding 
the Most 
Extreme 5% 
26%–85%  0%–85%  0%–84% 
 
Table 4: Percent with Extreme Decision Rates114 
Below 20% Favorable  2%  21%  18% 
Below 30% Favorable  6%  37%  36% 
Above 70% Favorable  13%  12%  8% 
Above 80% Favorable  4% 6% 3% 
C. Sources of Variance—District Court Judges and Magistrates 
Given the substantial variability in remand rates, we searched for 
variables that might explain these discrepancies. Explanatory variables 
might be identified from a variety of sources including characteristics of 
the judges, characteristics of their environment, and characteristics of the 
judicial circuit and district in which they sit. In order to identify which 
sources had the biggest impact on outcomes, we partitioned the observed 
variance into the variance associated with each source. This type of 
analysis does not identify specific explanatory variables, but rather helps 
to identify which sources are likely to yield such explanatory variables. 
That is, it asks whether the characteristics of the judges or the context of 
the cases more significantly impact the ultimate outcome. 
The data on remand rates have a hierarchical structure. Cases are 
nested within judges, who are nested within districts, which are nested 
 
 114. Favorable decisions refer to full or partial allowance by ALJs, and reversals or remands by 
judges and magistrates. ALJ statistics were obtained from Krent & Morris, supra note 18. ALJ means, 
SDs, and ranges were computed from all decisions issued in FYs 2009 through 2011. Percent of ALJs 
with extreme decision rates represent FY 2011. 
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within circuits. The relative contribution of different sources can be 
expressed in terms of the intraclass correlation coefficient (“ICC”), 
which indicates the proportion of the total variance that is attributable to 
each level of the hierarchy. The variance in remand rates was partitioned 
into three sources: variance across judges, variance across district courts, 
and variance across circuit courts.115 
Remand rates for district court judges were fairly stable over time. 
The overall remand rate did not change significantly over the three years 
examined: 38% in 2010; 43% in 2011; and 41% in 2012. Among the 121 
judges with enough data to compute yearly remand rate in at least two 
years, there was substantial consistency across time (ICC=.59). For the 
majority of judges, their highest yearly remand rate was no more than 
twenty percent greater than their lowest rate. Among judges who were in 
the top quarter of the distribution in one year, fifty-four percent of them 
were in the top quarter for two or more years. Less consistency was 
observed at the lower end of the distribution. Of those in the lower 
quarter of the distribution in at least one year, thirty percent were in the 
bottom quarter for multiple years. These results support the idea that 
many judges view cases through a lens that tends to favor one of the 
parties. 
Somewhat surprisingly, demographic characteristics of the judges in 
general did not correlate with rulings. Remand rates were similar for 
male (M=.43, SD=.20) and female judges (M=.39, SD=.24), and the 
difference was not statistically significant. The value of the T test with 
340 degrees of freedom (hereinafter denoted “t(340)”), was 1.30 with 
probability (“p”)=.20. Remand rates were similar for Caucasian (M=.29, 
SD=.23), African American (M=.44, SD=.23), and Latino (M=.46, 
SD=.18) judges. These differences were not significant, as indicated an  
F-ratio with 2 and 338 degrees of freedom (hereinafter, denoted 
“F(2, 339)”) of 1.29. Remand rates were not correlated with the judge’s 
age, as indicated by a correlation coefficient “r” of .02, which was not 
significant (“ns”). We also found no evidence that decisions were 
influenced by the judge’s experience (r’s ranged from -.04 to .05). We 
had imagined that views toward claimants might be correlated with 
either prior litigation experience in general or prior work for the 
government in particular. Remand rates also were not correlated with 
years on the bench, r=-.04, ns. We had thought it possible that a judge’s 
view of the disability system might differ dependent on his or her 
seniority. With respect to ideology, judges appointed by a Democratic 
president tended to have slightly higher remand rates (M=.42, SD=.22, 
 
 115. Yearly remand rates were computed for each year in which a judge issued at least five rulings. 
The resulting data consisted of 414 yearly remand rates from 232 district court judges, and 476 yearly 
remand rates from 160 magistrates. 
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Sample size (“N”)=147) than judges appointed by a Republican 
president (M=.38, SD=.24, N=195), t(340)=1.94, p=.05, but the difference 
is not that significant. Ideology as reflected in the politics of the 
appointing president, therefore, has had only modest impact on disability 
decisionmaking. 
Magistrate judge demographics similarly had little effect on remand 
rates. Remand rates were similar for male (M=.40, SD=.21) and female 
(M=.40, SD=.23) magistrates, t(277)=-0.11, ns. Remand rates were 
slightly lower for African American (M=.32, SD=.20) than Caucasian 
(M=.39, SD=.22) magistrates,116 but the difference was not statistically 
significant, t(186)=1.32, ns. Nor were remand rates correlated with 
magistrate age, r(N=232)=-.04, ns. 
Magistrate experience also was not related to outcomes. Neither 
were remand rates correlated with years on the bench, r(N=269)=-.09, ns, 
or specific types of prior experience (r’s ranged from -.02 to .09). For 
magistrates as well as district court judges, individual characteristics 
played no obvious role in explaining the substantial difference in remand 
rates.117 
Moreover, we also examined contextual characteristics of the sixty-
eight districts for which sufficient data were available to compute remand 
rates. Remand rates were not significantly correlated with the population 
of the district (r=.08) for either judges or magistrates. We thought it 
possible that judges and magistrates in smaller towns or closer to rural 
areas might tend to be more sympathetic to claimants. We also wondered 
whether judges and magistrates in areas where a significant number of 
individuals received disability benefits might tend, at the margin, to be 
more skeptical of claimants. A slight negative correlation was found 
between the remand rate and the proportion of the state population 
receiving disability benefits (r=-.29, p=.02), again for both judges and 
magistrates. That is, remand rates tended to be lower in states with 
higher disability rates. Finally, we checked if remand rates differed in 
Democrat-leaning, Republican-leaning, and neutral states, t(50.7) =1.05, ns. 
 
 116. Comparisons with other ethnic groups were not possible due to an insufficient number of 
magistrates. 
 117. A separate set of analyses was conducted on cases where the magistrate issued an R&R to the 
district judge. Data were available from 3534 cases where the magistrate provided R&R, which 
represented 46% of the magistrate decisions. In the vast majority of cases (94.7%), the district judge 
adopted the magistrate’s recommendation. Individual adoption rates were computed for 156 
magistrates who provided an R&R on at least five cases. Adoption rates ranged from 50% to 100%. 
The adoption rate was 100% for over half of the magistrates (53%), and for 78% of magistrates, over 
90% of their recommendations were adopted. The final decisions for cases where the magistrate 
provided an R&R (42% reversed or remanded) were similar to cases that did not involve an R&R 
(40% reversed or remanded). Examining only the sixty magistrates who had at least five cases of each 
type (R&R and non-R&R), we found that remand rates tended to be higher when making an R&R 
(45% remanded) than when not making an R&R (33% remanded), t(59) = 3.73, p<.001. 
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Perhaps the judicial decisionmakers would be swayed because of the 
political sentiment surrounding them, but no such correlation was found. 
Thus, despite the substantial inconsistencies in remand rates among 
district court judges and magistrates, we were not able to explain the 
variability by dint of ideology, demographic factors, or geographic 
location. Whatever prompts the different decisionmaking, therefore, 
cannot be tied to the same sociological and political factors that previous 
studies have focused on to explain variability in judging.118 Perhaps in low 
salience cases, which plainly include Social Security disability cases, 
political and sociological factors play no role. 
D. Variation in Judicial Circuits 
Although our study could not explain inconsistencies in 
decisionmaking by focusing on characteristics particular to each judge, 
including ideology and location, the picture changed dramatically when 
considering the judicial circuit in which the judge or magistrate sits. 
Remand rates differed significantly across circuits, F(10,331)=6.91, 
p<.001. Differences across circuits accounted for a sizable portion (17%) 
of the variance in remand rates. As shown in Figure 6, several circuits 
had average remand rates around 30% while others had average remand 
rates over 50%. Remand rates from district court judges in the Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits almost doubled the rates within the First and 
Fourth Circuit. Knowing the judicial circuit in which the appeal was filed 
was the single most significant factor we could trace in predicting 
whether there would be a remand. 
 
 118. See supra notes 10–11. 
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Figure 6: Average Remand Rate for District Court Judges  
by Circuit119 
 
Magistrate remand rates as well differed significantly across circuits, 
F(10,269)=5.2, p<.001. As with district court judges, the circuit in which a 
magistrate sits accounted for a substantial proportion (16%) of the 
variability across magistrates. As shown in Figure 7, several circuits 
showed remand rates around 30%, while the remand rate for the Seventh 
Circuit was over 60%. In circuits in which district court judges had high 
remand rates, magistrate rates were high as well, and magistrates and 
district court judges matched for lower remand rates. Thus, the remand 
rate in the Tenth Circuit for magistrates was significantly higher than for 
those within the Fourth Circuit.120 
This striking finding can be explained in several ways. First, to some 
extent, doctrine matters, and we suggest below one doctrinal split in 
particular that likely is correlated with higher remand rates. But, the 
doctrinal differences likely can only explain a sliver of the observed 
variances. We also posit that the “culture” within the circuit plays a 
significant part. That is, appellate judges in some circuits have set the 
tone that ALJ decisions might be so poorly crafted that remands are 
appropriate. 
 
 119. Error bars indicate one SD above and below the average. 
 120. A Government Accountability Office study based on remand and reversal rates for the 2005 
year reveals similar variability from circuit to circuit. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra 
note 77, at 15.  
G - Krent_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:39 PM 
February 2016]            SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY APPEALS 397 
Figure 7: Average Remand Rate for Magistrates by Circuit121  
 
With respect to doctrine, we were not able to identify conventional 
splits in the circuit courts on Social Security disability issues that could 
affect large groups of claimants. Nonetheless, at least one split exists that 
is consistent with the spread in remand rates circuit by circuit. Courts 
have disagreed whether an ALJ’s failure to cite a listed impairment that 
arguably matches a claimant’s condition requires a remand even if other 
SSA evidence suggests there is no disability. The Third Circuit in Burnett 
v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration122 and the Tenth 
Circuit in Clifton v. Chater123 held that such a failure automatically 
warrants remand. The Eighth Circuit, in contrast, has concluded that 
such an omission is not necessarily fatal.124 Perhaps coincidentally, the 
Eighth Circuit has a considerably lower remand rate than the other two 
circuits. 
We are convinced that the tone set by appellate courts affects the 
remand rate far more than doctrinal splits. There is a strong correlation 
between remand rate and those circuit courts that have been particularly 
hostile to SSA decisionmaking. That skepticism might in turn cue district 
court judges and magistrates to be more stringent in reviewing claimants’ 
appeals. 
 
 121. Error bars indicate one SD above and below the average. 
 122. 220 F.3d 112, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 123. 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 124. Senne v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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Consider, for instance, the “credit-as-true” rule embraced by the 
Ninth Circuit. There, courts will remand for a court-ordered award of 
benefits when the ALJ’s effort to discredit the treating source (that is, 
the physician) is deemed insufficient.125 Ninth Circuit courts credit the 
treating source testimony and remand for an award of benefits where: 
(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 
such testimony; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved 
before a determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from 
the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled 
were the testimony credited.126 In effect, the credit-as-true rule deprives 
an ALJ of a second opportunity to reweigh testimonial evidence or 
correct any errors in his or her initial opinion with respect to the treating 
source rule. As a result, claimants who are not disabled may receive 
benefits. 
To illustrate, in Folio v. Astrue, the district court reversed the 
agency’s decision and remanded for an award of benefits because the 
treating physician’s opinion stated that Folio was “permanently disabled.”127 
However, the same source opinion asserted that Folio’s “medical problems 
are stable;” that Folio is “fully aware of medication side effects;” and that 
“[h]is prognosis is fair to good, depending largely on how he controls his 
Diabetes.”128 
Alongside the treating physician’s ambiguous opinion, the record 
contained two examining non-treating opinions that were inconsistent 
with a conclusion of “permanent” disability, and so the ALJ relied on 
those opinions to contravene the treating source opinion. The ALJ also 
determined that the claimant had exaggerated his symptoms both in the 
hearing and to the treating physician. Upon finding that the ALJ did not 
adequately articulate a rejection of Folio’s treating physician’s opinion, 
the district court ordered an award of benefits relying on the treating 
source opinion’s conclusion that Folio was “permanently disabled.”129 
The court order awarding benefits deprived the ALJ of an opportunity to 
provide additional articulation of the reasons why he denied “controlling 
weight” to the treating physician’s opinion. Indeed, the ALJ had also 
 
 125. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because the ALJ failed to provide 
legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Benecke’s . . . treating physicians’ opinion[], we credit the 
evidence as true.”). 
 126. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 
Admin., 682 F.3d 1157 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding further proceedings were not necessary and 
remanding for an award of benefits where “[t]he complete record show[ed] that Brewes [was] likely to 
miss multiple days of work per month [and] [t]he vocational expert testified that a person with Brewes’ 
characteristics who would miss that much work was not employable.”). 
 127. No. CV 06-2700-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 3982972, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2008). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at *8. 
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determined that the claimant exaggerated his symptoms both in the 
hearing and to the treating physician. 
In Young v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration130 the 
Commissioner conceded that the ALJ improperly discredited a treating 
source, but sought remand for further proceedings to permit the ALJ to 
make additional findings with respect to the disabling effects of the 
claimant’s mental condition. Claimant’s physician opined that the 
claimant had marked limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace.131 
If the medical evidence were credited as true it would have pointed to an 
emotional disorder.132 However, establishing an emotional disorder or a 
dysthymic disorder generally is not “per se disabling.”133 Instead of 
remanding for determination of the disabling effects of the claimant’s 
impairment, however, the court remanded for a calculation of benefits.134 
Application of the credit-as-true rule, where evidence might have 
supported either outcome, effectively supplants the judgment of the ALJ 
for that of the reviewing court.135 
The credit-as-true rule sets a tone that ALJ decisionmaking is not to 
be trusted. One judge opened her opinion by noting “[t]his matter is now 
nearly fifteen years old and has a record that is nearly 1,000 pages.”136 
The opinion continued by elaborating upon the long procedural history 
of the case before beginning any analysis of the issues. The court 
ultimately found that the ALJ erred by discrediting three treating source 
opinions without clear and convincing reasons.137 Given the Ninth 
Circuit’s credit-as-true precedent, the judge terminated the proceedings 
and ordered an immediate payment of benefits.138 An understandable 
frustration with delay might sway judges to award immediate benefits 
rather than remanding for further fact finding. At the end of a separate 
opinion, a judge concluded, “[i]n light of the extensive delay in Plaintiff’s 
application for benefits, the Court invokes its discretion and remands this 
 
 130. No. CV 09-744-KI, 2010 WL 360776, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *3. 
 133. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 134. Young, 2010 WL 360776, at *4. 
 135. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The trier of fact and not the 
reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, 
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 
389, 400 (1971)); see also Agnew-Currie v. Astrue, 875 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (D. Ariz. 2012) (holding 
that credit-as-true rule was discretionary because it otherwise would result in payment of benefits 
where not due under the statute). 
 136. Feskens v. Astrue, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111 (D. Or. 2011). 
 137. Id. at 1122. 
 138. Id. at 1122–23. 
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case for the payment of benefits . . . . Further delays at this point would 
be unduly burdensome on Plaintiff.”139 
The credit-as-true rule leads to reversal as opposed to remand, so it 
is not directly responsible for the Ninth Circuit’s higher than average 
remand rate. Nonetheless, it signals that review of agency decisionmaking 
should be strict, and district court judges and magistrates evidently 
follow that tone in finding that ALJ decisions lack sufficient persuasive 
value to uphold the Secretary’s denial of disability. 
Consider, as well, the Seventh Circuit’s professed frustration with 
the quality of ALJ decisionmaking. ALJs labor under a target of issuing 
500 to 700 decisions a year. They give instructions to decision writers to 
draft their decisions and often review the decision writers’ efforts in a 
cursory fashion. The result can be poorly reasoned decisions. The ALJs 
might have reached the right result, but not in a coherent judge-like 
manner. Indeed, SSA itself has concluded that much ALJ decisionmaking 
reflects more of a gestalt-type approach than the rigorous analysis that 
typically marks agency and district court decisions.140 
For instance, in Bjornson v. Astrue141 Judge Richard Posner 
castigated the agency for its crude efforts in writing decisions: “Reading 
the administrative law judge’s opinion, we first stubbed our toe on a 
piece of opaque boilerplate . . . where . . . the opinion states . . . ‘the 
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 
effects of these symptoms are not credible . . . .’”142 The Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion related that the ALJ’s “‘template’ is a variant of one that this 
court (and not only this court) had criticized previously . . . . The 
statement by a trier of fact that the witness’s testimony is ‘not entirely 
credible’ yields no clue as to what weight the trier of fact gave the 
testimony.”143 Indeed, “[s]uch boilerplate language fails to inform us in a 
meaningful, reviewable way of the specific evidence the ALJ considered 
in determining that the claimant’s complaints were not credible.”144 The 
agency’s regulations provide that “an individual’s statements about the 
intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect 
the symptoms have on . . . her ability to work may not be disregarded 
 
 139. D’Angelo v. Astrue, No. CV 06-03055-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 4617186, at *9 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 
2007). 
 140. Judge Gerald Ray Addresses Disability Adjudication Consistency, Executive Director’s 
Broadcast (ODAR Off. of App. Operations), Jan. 13, 2012, at 6 (“People frequently use heuristics, or 
rules of thumb, to form a mental framework to simplify consideration of issues . . . . However, use of 
inartfully crafted heuristics to view a problem . . . may result in framing issues too narrowly, 
overreliance on incomplete information, and limiting consideration of options . . . .”). 
 141. 671 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2012). Bjornson followed a line of similar decisions. See, e.g., Martinez v. 
Astrue, 630 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2011); Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 142. Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 644. 
 143. Id. at 645. 
 144. Id. (quoting Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
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solely because they are not substantiated by objective medical 
evidence.”145 An ALJ disbelieving a claimant’s testimony must therefore 
justify that belief as opposed to presenting the conclusion. In Bjornson, 
itself, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s decision, though 
manifesting skepticism about the claimant’s testimony of pain, “failed to 
build a bridge between the medical evidence (along with Bjornson’s 
testimony, which seems to have been fully consistent with that evidence) 
and the conclusion that she is able to work . . . .”146 
The problem with much ALJ decisionmaking is that while the 
decisions tell us why the ALJ believes that the claimant is not disabled, 
they do not provide sufficient reasoning to allow meaningful review.147 
Conversely, a recent study by SSA’s Office of the Inspector General 
examined 275 sample grant decisions from so-termed outlier ALJs, that 
is, those with grant rates in excess of eighty-five percent.148 The SSA 
study concluded that 216 of the 275 decisions had “quality issues,” and of 
those SSA’s Division of Quality remanded half back to the ALJ for 
correction.149 ALJ decisions granting benefits as well suffer from 
inadequate explanation. 
Indeed, of greater salience, SSA’s Office of General Counsel 
(“OGC”) in a significant number of cases declines to represent the 
agency decision in court, and instead, seeks a consent order with the 
 
 145. Soc. Sec. Admin., Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in 
Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements, SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 
374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996). 
 146. 671 F.3d at 649. 
 147. Similar issues arise in application of the treating source rule, pursuant to which ALJs must 
give special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The regulations provide in pertinent part:  
Generally, we give more weight to opinions from [the claimant’s] treating sources, since 
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, 
longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique 
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical 
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations 
or brief hospitalizations. If [SSA] find[s] that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of 
the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically 
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the 
other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record, [SSA] will give it controlling 
weight . . . . 
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2) (2015). The problem is that there are often multiple treating physicians and a 
number of non-treating physician opinions as well, and reconciling them can be quite difficult. ALJs 
have struggled to assign the proper weight to each medical opinion offered, and courts have 
scrutinized excessively the justifications that ALJs proffer to discredit the treating physician opinion. 
Too little of the analysis has centered on the pivotal issue of disability itself. The complexity of the 
inquiry provides ample room for district court judges and magistrates to reach whichever result they 
prefer. 
 148. Office of the Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., A-12-14-24092, Administrative Law 
Judges with Both High Dispositions and High Allowance Rates 2 (2014). 
 149. Id. at 4–5. 
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claimant to remand the case back to the agency.150 Typical reasons 
include inadequate ALJ analysis of the material in the file, contradictions 
within the ALJ decision itself, or new evidence presented.151 The 
attorneys in the OGC believe that such decisions will not survive judicial 
review as written.152 The fact that OGC itself refuses to defend as written 
roughly fifteen percent of the cases appealed153 strongly illustrates the 
problem of poorly written opinions.154 For appellate judges, such 
sloppiness is an affront to the judicial process, and the opinion in 
Bjornson and many more155 signal to district court judges and magistrates 
to resist boilerplate and require ALJ decisionmaking, rushed though it is, 
to adhere to basic tenets of judicial opinion writing.156 This is not to 
suggest that judges in other jurisdictions would disagree with Judge 
Posner’s analysis, but they might have more faith that the ALJs’ gestalt-
like analysis of the claims satisfies the substantial evidence test. 
Although decisions in other circuits have, at times, manifested 
skepticism of ALJ decisionmaking in the disability context, only the 
Tenth and Seventh Circuits have chastised ALJs for use of boilerplate 
language per se. In contrast, some courts outside those circuits have 
critiqued the Bjornson formulation. For instance, in Jones v. Commissioner 
of Social Security,157 the district court noted that the Sixth Circuit did not 
embrace Bjornson and counseled against a broad reading. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit has a far more modest remand rate than 
 
 150. From FY 2006 to FY 2011, the numbers of voluntary requests for remand were: 2229 in FY 
2011; 2419 in FY 2010; 2403 in 2008; 2496 in FY 2007; and 2763 in FY 2006. No information was 
available for FY 2009 due to a change in software. Those numbers represent roughly fifteen percent of 
all cases appealed. Krent & Morris, supra note 18, at 9 (referring to follow-up email to discussion with 
Jeff Blair of the Office of General Counsel on Sept. 14, 2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. The same sloppiness is even more pronounced in decisions granting benefits given that those 
decisions generally are shorter and ALJs know that such decisions will not be subject to judicial 
review. A recent investigation by Republican staffers on the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigation focused on 300 randomly selected agency grants. It concluded that ALJs’ reasoning in 
roughly twenty-five present of the cases “failed to properly address insufficient, contradictory or 
incomplete evidence.” Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong., Social Security Disability Programs: Improving the Quality 
of Benefit Award Decisions 3–4 (2012). 
 155. See, e.g., Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004) (criticizing SSA use of 
boilerplate “almost without regard to whether the boilerplate paragraph has any relevance to the case”). 
 156. Judge Posner’s critique of ALJ sloppiness continues. See, e.g., Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. 
Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2015) (analogizing ALJs to assembly line workers whose quality 
of work will deteriorate as the pressure to decide more cases mounts); see also Goins v. Colvin, 764 
F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2014) (ordering a remand just two weeks after oral argument based on numerous 
weaknesses in ALJ opinion). 
 157. No. 2:12-cv-110, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155228, at *17–22 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2013). 
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the Seventh, Ninth, or Tenth.158 Similarly, district courts in the Fifth 
Circuit have distanced themselves from Bjornson. The district court in 
Kiefer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration,159 for instance, 
explained that the “Fifth Circuit will remand an ALJ’s decision where 
consideration of the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain is wholly 
excluded. However, the Fifth Circuit will uphold a decision where the 
ALJ acknowledges the pain, cites the regulation, summarizes evidence 
relevant to some of the . . . factors.”160 The court did not appear to be a 
stickler for precise analysis. And, another district court within the Fifth 
Circuit stressed in Morris v. Colvin161 that the “Court is mindful of the 
boilerplate language used by the ALJ, but the deference this Court must 
give to the Commissioner requires that it take the ALJ’s findings, as long 
as supported by substantial evidence, at face value.” The remand rate for 
courts in the Fifth Circuit, as in the Sixth, is much lower than in the 
Seventh Circuit. 
In contrast, district courts in the Second Circuit have cited Bjornson 
approvingly,162 and the Second Circuit’s remand rate is high as well. 
Bjornson does not purport to alter the doctrine by which the agency 
decisions are reviewed, but its toneand the tone of similar 
decisionsevidently made a difference. In short, the circuit in which the 
district court judge and magistrate sits is the factor that best explains the 
observed statistical inconsistency in remand rates. That variability to a 
modest degree might stem from doctrinal differences from circuit to 
circuitthat is, doctrine matters. But, we conclude that the remand rate 
differences derive substantially from appellate court criticism of the 
structure of ALJ determinations and insistence that SSA ALJ decisions 
be analyzed just like any other agency decision. The tone is set at the top, 
and the statistical analysis lends credence to the impact that such 
statements have on subordinate decisionmakers within the Article III 
judicial system. 
We do not make the claim that a circuit court’s culture is a perfect 
explanatory variable. Some district court judges and magistrates value 
their independence, recognize that SSDI and SSI decisions are not likely 
to be appealed, and find for or against claimants as they deem fit. Indeed, 
 
 158. See also Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:13-cv-01672, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90935 (N.D. 
Ohio May 28, 2014). Even the Tenth Circuit has distanced itself to some extent from Bjornson. See 
Romero v. Colvin, 563 F. Appx. 618 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 159. No. 4:13-CV-330, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80429 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2014). 
 160. Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
 161. No. 6:12-2692-JFA-KRM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186067, at *38 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2013) 
(quoting Craven v. Astrue, 9:11–cv–01674–RBH, 2013 WL 1282022 at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2013).  
 162. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Colvin, No. 3:2cv1817(DJS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112490 (D. Conn. 
Aug. 13, 2014); Ferguson v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-0333(MAT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109996 (W.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 8, 2014).  
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we found significant inconsistency from district to district even within 
particular circuits. 
Of the total variance in remand rates, nearly half (43%) occurred 
between districts. District remand rates ranged from as low as 12% in the 
Western District of Missouri to as high as 77% in the Western District of 
Washington.163 About 10% of districts had remand rates below 20% and 
10% had rates over 60%. About one-third of this between district 
variance could be attributed to differences across circuits.164 That is, there 
was substantially more consistency among districts within a circuit than 
between districts from different circuits. 
The general pattern is illustrated by a comparison of the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits. Although remand rates were generally higher in the 
Ninth Circuit than in the Sixth Circuit, there were also sizable differences 
within these circuits. In the Sixth Circuit, remand rates ranged from 18% 
in the Middle District of Tennessee and 19% in the Western District of 
Michigan to 46% in Southern District of Ohio. In the Ninth Circuit the 
remand rate was as low as 21% in the Southern District of California and 
as high as 77% in the Western District of Washington. Despite these 
discrepancies, remand rates tended to be somewhat consistent across 
districts within many of the circuits. For example, the Third Circuit 
ranged from 36% to 53%, and the Tenth Circuit ranged from 60% to 
69%. A similar pattern of circuit and district level effects was observed 
for magistrates. Remand rates for magistrates correlated strongly with 
those of district court judges in the same district, r=.69, p<.001. Thus, 
taken as a whole, the different remand rates from circuit to circuit 
strongly suggest that many district court judges and magistrates follow 
cues from the appellate courts. 
Conclusion 
In essence, our study reveals that law broadly understood might 
affect judging more than judicial ideology and demographic factors, at 
least in low salience cases such as SSDI and SSI adjudication. The wide 
disparity in remand rates among hundreds of district court judges and 
magistrates can be explained more by the tone set by appellate judges in 
 
 163. Some of the observed differences could be due to chance, owing to the small number of 
decisions available for some districts. For about a quarter of the districts, rates were computed from 
fifteen or fewer decisions. Still, even among districts with larger sample sizes, remand rates were as low 
as 12% in the Western District of Missouri with fifty-one decisions from four judges, or 13% in the 
Eastern District of Virginia from nine judges in 113 decisions. The remand rate of 77% for the 
Western District of Washington was based on 213 decisions from ten judges. 
 164. The variance in remand rates was partitioned into differences across circuits (14%), 
differences across districts within a circuit (29%), and differences among judges within a district (57%). 
The total variance across districts, comprised of both between-circuit and within-circuit components, 
accounted for 14% + 29% = 43% of the variance. Focusing on the variance among districts, 
14% / 43% = 33% could be attributed to differences between circuits. 
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each circuit than by the political preferences or vocational experience of 
the jurists. Perhaps, at the end of day, the results should not be 
surprising, because appellate leadership, if not review, can make a 
difference. 
Congress and SSA must assess how to reshape ALJ decisionmaking 
so that ALJs can satisfy the demands on judicial technique that Article 
III judges expect from agency administrative decisions. Perhaps ALJs 
need more time to write adequate decisions; perhaps ALJs need to 
coordinate more effectively with decision writers. Or, perhaps judicial 
review of facts is not appropriate in the disability context.165 But, for the 
near future, the remand rate overall will remain high, and particularly so 
in the Tenth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits, as a result of the direction that 
those circuit court judges have given to district court judges and magistrates 
in their circuits. 
 
 165. For years after its founding, Congress provided no judicial review for denial of veterans’ 
benefits claims, and now provides only for limited review of factual issues. See, e.g., James D. Ridgway, 
The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial 
Review, 3 Veterans L. Rev. 135 (2011). 
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